Abstract: This paper focuses on the fact that recycled material needs reprocessing to be substitutable for virgin material. More than one-third of household recyclables are tarnished with residues. Reprocessing consumes resources and, in the process, generates pollution. Incorporating these 'imperfect' characteristics of recycling and reprocessing into a simple general equilibrium model, I examine effects on the structure of tax-subsidy schemes when the first-best Pigouvian taxes are not available. A generalized Deposit-Refund system can achieve the optimum if illegal dumping is not taxable. Without a Pigouvian tax on illegal dumping, however, recycling is subsidized for its role in diverting illegal into proper disposal. If Pigouvian taxes on illegal disposal or waste from imperfect reprocessing are not available, a combination of output taxes on reprocessed material and subsidies for clean inputs can be used to restore the optimum. In the process, another reason to subsidize recycling emerges: recycling is a clean input for imperfect reprocessing. Therefore, recycling should be further encouraged by policymakers to achieve higher levels of resource circulation and a more sustainable economy, even if recycling is accompanied by imperfect reprocessing.
I. Introduction
In recent years, the issues on waste have drawn a lot of attention in environmental and economic areas since generation and disposal of waste increasingly burdens the environment as well as economic efficiency. The World Bank estimates the amount of municipal solid waste (MSW) will rise from 1.3 billion tons per year to 2.2 billion per year by 2025. Much of the increase will come in fast growing urban areas in developing countries (World Bank, 2012) . As of 2014, about 258 million tons of MSW was generated in the United States alone, which was 208 million tons in 1990. This means that each person generated an average of 2.0 kg of solid waste per person per day, which has been steadied since 1990 (US EPA, 2016) . In 2016, the EU 28 member countries generated an average of 1.32 kg per person per day, which was at the peak of 1.43 kg in 2000 (Eurostat, 2018) . In developing countries, each person presently generates less than 1 kg of waste per day, however, rapid urbanization along with economic development suggests that their waste generation and disposal problems will become more serious in the near future (World Bank, 1999) . The situation in South Korea lies between the EU and developing countries. The annual MSW generation has been relatively stable under 400 kg per for the 1997~2016 period, recording 383 kg Recycling is often assumed perfect in the sense that any recycled materials by households can be perfectly substitutable as an input for production (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995; Fullerton and Wu, 1998; Walls and Palmer, 2001 ). This paper shows theoretically that the optimal tax-subsidy schemes can still be achieved, even when recycling and reprocessing are imperfect. This paper recognizes the fact that household recycling is not perfect. Household recycles usually need treatment or reprocessing to be used later for the production of consumption goods. For example, post-consumer recycling of plastics is complicated because it is often confusing to tell apart one type from another by sight or touch. Many households usually collect plastics without considering their exact types. Even a small amount of the wrong type of plastic can ruin the whole melt. Therefore, in this paper, recycling per se is not assumed to be final in reducing waste permanently; only the proportion properly reprocessed and used in successive stages of production contributes to reduction in waste. For example, any mixed plastics and wet newspapers are useless or too expensive to salvage for reprocessing firms. Therefore, I assume that only properly reprocessed recycles can be used in production, and I explicitly take account of this point by separating reprocessing from recycling.
Second, previous literature also usually assumes that reprocessing is perfect. However, reprocessing costs private resources and, more often than not, generates waste. Reprocessing waste or pollution could be just any residuals unsuccessfully reprocessed from household recyclables or might be generated due to the inherent technological limits in reprocessing. For example, waste oil (used motor oil from cars) can be reused after proper reprocessing treatment, but it would generate impurities that have to be disposed after reprocessing. Waste tires, after taken off cars, can be used as fuel because they have very high BTU. However, burning waste tires generate several toxic gases.
Using a simple analytical general equilibrium, I solve for the combinations of tax-subsidy instruments that achieve the first-best social optimum. I also examine what roles household recycling have in remedying the negative externalities from various sources, and how imperfectness of recycling and reprocessing built into the model affects the characteristics of a generalized optimal D-R system adopting the two-part instrument.
If the first-best Pigouvian taxes are available, then the optimal corrective tax on each activity causing a negative externality is equal to its marginal environmental damages (MED). In this case, other output and input taxes are not necessary. And a subsidy for household recycling is also unnecessary because recycling improves (or harms) the environment only through successful reprocessing.
Since the reprocessing externality is corrected by an existing Pigouvian tax, recycling is neither rewarded nor penalized.
If illegal disposal or dumping cannot be properly taxed due to monitoring and enforcement problems, that is, if a Pigouvian tax on illegal disposal is not feasible, then a combination of a presumptive output tax and the corresponding subsidies for proper garbage disposal and for household recycling is optimal (i.e., a two-part instrument). In this case, a charge on garbage disposal should be lowered by the extent that proper disposal diverts illegal dumping. The important point is that a recycling subsidy is also needed because recycling also diverts illegal dumping to proper disposal.
In the following Chapter Ⅱ, I briefly review several previous studies. I introduce the model in Chapter Ⅲ. In Chapter Ⅳ, I derive the outcome in the social planning model and the outcome in the decentralized market. Then, I compare the decentralized outcome with the social planner's and derive the first-best optimal tax-subsidy schemes, first assuming that a Pigouvian tax on the use of reprocessed materials is available and then relaxing that assumption.
Finally, Chapter Ⅴ is for conclusions and further discussion.
Ⅱ. Literature Review
Economic theory suggests that a regulator can achieve the social optimum by imposing a tax on waste-generating activity or by subsidizing its reduction (Pigou, 1932) . A direct application of this approach to the MSW problem is the per-unit charge: the practice of charging waste generators for each bag or container of trash. If the per-unit charge on disposal is equal to the sum of the marginal private cost of waste collection and disposal plus any environmental externalities, and if it is perfectly enforceable, then the resulting level of MSW disposal will be optimal (Jenkins, 1993) .
However, it is practically impossible to tax the polluting activity directly because the informational burden is stiff and, therefore, administrative and enforcement costs would be huge. Furthermore, these charges can make the environmental problems worse if the possibility of illegal disposal is real (US EPA, 1998) . In that case, introduction of unit-pricing policy might increase illegal dumping or burning (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995; Sigman, 1995) . The first-best optimal tax on waste cannot be achieved when household waste reduction effort is significant and possibility of illegal waste disposal exists (Choe and Fraser, 1999) Another important weakness of unit-pricing policy is that its price elasticity might be quite low (Choe and Fraser, 1998) . Even after the introduction of unit-pricing, the reduction of MSW tends to be small in many cases (Yoshida, 2002) .
Without an enforceable Pigouvian tax or collection charge, many studies show that a combination of output tax and recycling subsidy, also known as a deposit-refund (D-R) system, can achieve the first-best outcome. For example, using a general equilibrium model, Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) show that the optimal D-R system consists of an output tax combined with a subsidy for recycling, and for proper garbage disposal, with each rate set on the basis of the marginal social cost of disposal. In the process, recycling has drawn great attention from many researchers due to its roles in waste management.
Other studies have also identified these aspects but examined them differently from my model. In particular, Eichner and Pethig (2001) consider the case that producers can change material mix of a final good by product design. One of these materials is recyclable, and a greater recyclable share in the output makes it easier to recover and reuse the material. They acknowledge that recycling of material is necessarily incomplete. They allow for the possibility that this 'waste material' is environmentally harmful after recycling, and that reprocessing is not completely substitutable. They focus their attention to the "material content" of products, which is a more the first from the role that diverts illegal disposal as noted earlier.
The second part of a recycling subsidy comes from the imperfectness in reprocessing. In the absence of a Pigouvian tax on reprocessing waste, an additional 'two-part instrument' should be implemented. In this case, it consists of a presumptive output tax on reprocessed material and the subsidies for clean inputs (e.g., labor) and for household recycling. Again, this imperfectness factor in recycling does not change the importance of a recycling subsidy: it can be handled by a charge for proper garbage disposal. But the fact that reprocessing is imperfect can only be handled by a subsidy for recycling when a first-best Pigouvian tax on waste from reprocessing is not available.
Before presenting the model in Chapter Ⅲ, it would be helpful to clarify two terminologies: imperfect recycling and imperfect reprocessing. By 'imperfect recycling,' I mean that the recycling activities by households are partial. It could be so because households do not always know how to correctly recycle many different materials.
By 'imperfect reprocessing,' I mean that the reprocessing technology is not perfect. 
Ⅲ. The Model
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( 1) where • is continuous and quasi-concave, with first derivatives    ,    , and    . That is, all three kinds of disposal by households can increase the quantity of consumption . This relationship also depicts how the household is able to shift among disposal methods. With a given amount of consumption, the household may be able to reduce  and/or increase  by engaging in various activities such as collecting plastic and newspapers and/or increase  by burning garbage in her backyard or dumping them in public places at night. Therefore, the above equation (1) In the household garbage collection industry, firms use resources   , as the only input with a linear production technology:
Firms extracting virgin materials produce , use resources   , and generate pollution with a constant returns to scale technology:
with both first derivatives   and   positive. Thus, firms have to use more input materials and/or allow more pollution to produce more virgin materials.
Reprocessing firms collect potentially recyclable materials  from households, reprocess it into reprocessed material , and supply to the producers of the consumption good. In doing so, they use resources   and generate reprocessing waste   :
with all the first derivatives   ,   and   positive. Note that, like firms in extracting virgin materials, reprocessing firms can increase output if they increase pollution from reprocessing    or any other input. Previous literature usually assumes that household recycling is complete and final, so that any recycled materials can be used as inputs for production without further waste. However, recycled materials by households usually require treatment or reprocessing to be used later for the production of consumption goods. For example, recycling newspaper involves de-inking process of wet papers and generates residues, which have to be landfilled.
The consumption good is produced using a constant returns to scale production function
with input of resources   , virgin materials , and reprocessed materials . 1) Since all production functions are constant returns to scale, the scale of the firm is irrelevant. Thus, I can assume that each symbol above represents an amount per capita.
1) Note that the above production function (5) is general with respect to the relation between  and . For example, this production function includes a special case where virgin and reprocessed and/or recycled materials are homogeneous in quality and, therefore, can be used as a perfect substitute for each other:
Utility of each individual depends positively on the amount of consumption good purchased in the market    and leisure use of time and resources      . It depends negatively on the total amount of garbage generated by households  ≡ , the total amount of pollution generated in the production of virgin material    ≡    , and the aggregate pollution generated in the production of reprocessed material   ≡   . 2) Utility also depends on the aggregate pollution generated by illegal burning or dumping  ≡  . These four negative externalities could require four Pigouvian taxes. If any one such Pigouvian tax is not available, it can be replaced by a two-part instrument. Some of those two-part instruments might imply a subsidy to recycling, and some might not.
The utility function is clean-up problems, more-so than proper disposal of garbage in a landfill (Ferrara, 2003) .
2) Extraction of virgin materials may reduce the utility of others. For example, cutting timber may reduce the enjoyment of natural areas and possibly aggravate global warming (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995 This point will be discussed with the analytical results later.
Finally, the model is closed by the overall resource constraint:
Outcome in the Social Planner's Problem
The social planner maximizes the utility of the representative household in (6) subject to the social planner's constraint (5) that is reformularized with the resource constraint and production functions
(1) and (7). The resource and production constraints can be substituted directly, to maximize the appropriate Lagrangian:
with respect to , ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   and   . I assume that a unique and internal solution exists. The first-order conditions are as follows:
and
where  denotes the social marginal utility of income,   is the marginal product of capital used in the production of consumption good ,   is the marginal product of reprocessed materials ,   indicates the marginal products of virgin materials , and   is the marginal product of resources used in reprocessing   .
The equations from (8a) to (8h) state that each input should be employed up to the point where its marginal social benefit equals its marginal social cost. In (8a), for instance, the monetary value of utility from consumption made possible by a unit of garbage        is reduced by the utility cost of the garbage externality      before comparison with the production cost of garbage.
Outcome in the Decentralized Model
For the case of private markets, individuals maximize utility in (6) subject to a budget constraint that may be affected by a tax or subsidy on each good,
where   is the price earned on resources, the price of consumption good equals one     since  is numeraire,   is the tax per unit of consumption,   is the price paid by households for proper garbage collection,   is the tax per unit of garbage,   is the price for recyclables paid by the reprocessing firms to the households (which could be positive or negative),   is the tax on (or subsidy for) the household per unit of potentially recyclable materials collected by the household, and   is an ideal Pigouvian tax on illegal disposal. 4) Note that the private cost of illegal disposal     is included in the budget constraint.
Consumption goods producers receive a price       for selling  and pay for inputs   ,  and . Their profits are expressed as follows:
where   is the tax on the resources used in production of consumption good   ,   is the price paid for virgin materials,   is the tax per unit of virgin materials,   is the price of reprocessed materials, and   is the tax per unit of household recycling. Under perfect competition with constant returns to scale, maximization of   gives the following first-order conditions: 
For reprocessing firms, the following profit function is maximized:
Using (10a) and (10c), the first-order conditions can be simplified as follows:
Finally, virgin materials producers maximize the following profit function:
Using (10a) and (10b) to simplify the first-order conditions:
In this decentralized economy, the consumer chooses , ,  and  to maximize utility in (6) subject to the budget constraint in ( 
Now I can find the optimal tax and subsidy rates in equations (14) that make those market conditions in (14) match up perfectly with the social planner's conditions in (8). If the market does achieve the optimum, then    from (8d) and (14d).
By comparison of (8) and (14),
This is the standard result from the general principle of Pigou (1932) : the optimal corrective tax on an activity causing a negative externality is equal to its MED. Therefore, any output or input taxes become unnecessary if the first-best Pigouvian taxes are available.
Note that the tax on household recycling is zero      . Household recycling itself has no external effect. It improves (or harms) the environment only through reprocessing. Since any waste generated by reprocessing firms is already taxed according to its damage to the environment      , household recycling should is neither rewarded nor penalized.
Note that the first-best optimal taxes on virgin waste    and on reprocessing waste     can be collapsed into a single optimal tax on waste   , if there is no difference between household recycling and reprocessing.
Can the environmental authority estimate the necessary quantity restrictions from these results and implement the command and control policies such as mandatory recycling for households and/or minimum recycled-content standards on producers in order to achieve socially efficient outcomes? At least in theory, it appears to be possible. As Palmer and Walls (1997) show, however, such standards by themselves can achieve the social optimum only when combined with additional taxes on both the final product and other inputs. Furthermore, the information burden required to achieve those efficient outcomes would be huge, and so this information is not likely to be available to policymakers.
It is not certain if illegal disposal increases after introducing a tax
on garbage pickup services. On one hand, some studies (Reschovsky and Stone, 1994; Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996) report that this was indeed the case, especially in the densely populated urban areas of the city. On the other hand, there exist other studies that report the contrary (Miranda and LaPalme, 1997; Nestor and Podolsky, 1998) .
Even if illegal disposal was initially caused by the imposition of a price on garbage, it might not long remain a serious problem (OECD, 2004 ).
When Illegal Disposal Cannot be Taxed
The first-best Pigouvian taxes on disposal derived in the previous section is generally considered to be impractical. In particular, a simple  is not available due to various difficulties, a combination of proper "two-part instruments" can be used instead (Fullerton and Wolverton, 1999) . case, the optimal tax and subsidy rates show that garbage receives a net subsidy (because it is assumed that      ).
It is obvious that the disposal fee is less than the
6) This case would be also relevant in some developed countries that have vast and less-populated areas like Australia (Choe and Fraser, 1998) .
means that higher price of garbage bag is likely to increase illegal burning or dumping. Hence, it would be more beneficial to maintain the price of garbage bag lower than the level of the first-best case. Or if a pay-as-you-throw waste charge is enforced, intensive materials separation services should be provided, too (Palatnik et al., 2014) .
Note that the tax on household recycling      is negative (i.e., a subsidy). Recall that the first-best optimal subsidy for recycling was is not used to encourage recycling or to discourage the generation of waste. Therefore, the environmental authority should not attempt to use this upstream tax to solve the externalities from downstream activity. This confirms the results from Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) and Walls and Palmer (2001) .
My model shows that the same logic can be applied to the case of a Pigouvian tax on reprocessing waste. The optimal tax on waste or pollution generated from reprocessing     is also exactly equal to the MED caused by reprocessing: it is not used to remedy the imperfectness of household recycling or to discourage illegal dumping. This result implies that the environmental authority should not be confused between two different kinds of imperfectness between household recycling and reprocessing. Household recycling should be subsidized exactly to the extent that it diverts potential illegal dumping. It should not be penalized based on any presumptive mistakes that households might cause such as placing recyclables into garbage containers. Any household recyclables sent to landfill sites due to incomplete recycling can be charged with    
When Pigouvian Taxes are Unavailable
In practical viewpoint, it is not much easier to implement the first-best Pigouvian taxes on both reprocessing waste    and virgin material extraction externality     than a tax on illegal dumping or burning   . It would be difficult to monitor pollutants accurately and to enforce the optimal charges. Although this paper primarily focuses on the optimal MSW policies, any efforts to reduce MSW are intrinsically related to other forms of pollutants such as air borne particles and sewage. These factors dramatically increase the difficulties in gathering any necessary information to calculate the optimal rates of Pigouvian taxes and in enforcing them.
Even if no Pigouvian taxes are available, however, the environmental authority still can find the appropriate first-best tax-subsidy scheme to achieve the optimum, as follows.
    then the social planner's first-best FOC can still be satisfied if:
The different 
Ⅴ. Conclusions and Further Discussion
In recent years, environmental concerns about generation and disposal of municipal solid waste have greatly increased in both developed and developing countries. Economic theory suggests that the social optimum can be achieved by imposing a tax on waste-generating activity or by subsidizing its reduction.
The per-unit charge on household garbage has been proposed to implement this approach and accepted by many municipalities and countries, even though the informational burden is heavy and often the actual rates of the per-unit charge are believed to deviate from the optimal ones. Furthermore, these charges can make the environmental problems worse if the possibility of illegal disposal is present. Therefore, a Depost-Refund (D-R) system has recently been in the center of discussion. In general, a presumptive output tax combined with subsidies for recycling and proper garbage disposal can achieve the social optimum in the presence of illegal disposal.
Previous studies, however, have assumed that recycling is perfect in the sense that any recycled materials by households can be substitutable for virgin material without reprocessing. Furthermore, reprocessing is also usually assumed perfect in the sense that no reprocessing waste or pollution is generated during the process. Is it possible to implement any other tax-subsidy schemes without relying on the use of a recycling subsidy? The answer would depend on whether the environmental authority has any other policy instruments to use following this simple logic of the 'two-part instrument.' For example, assuming substitutability between household recycling and virgin material as well as no externalities from reprocessing, the authority can still achieve optimum by subsidizing another clean input if a subsidy for recycling is not available as shown in Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) . However, if recycling is imperfect and reprocessing generates waste as modeled here, then a subsidy for recycling becomes an indispensable instrument since the household recycling enters into both the household's consumption function and into reprocessing firms' production function.
These results imply that recycling still has important roles to achieve to achieve higher levels of resource circulation and a more sustainable More recently, the waste pickup services in Korea observed a sudden disruption in major metropolitan areas in April 2018. On the surface, China's prohibition of waste import was spotted as the main factor. In the process, however, the weaknesses of waste management system in Korea has been exposed. Households are required to source separate various recyclables such as plastics, paper, and glass bottles from waste. But the pickup service refused to collect them claiming that a substantial portion of recyclables were mixed and contaminated with dirt, which were hard to reprocess. To solve these problems, the Korean Government announced the First National Framework Plan for
Resource Circulation (2018~2027) (hereafter, FNFPRC) in September 2018 with the goals of reducing waste generation by 20 percent and increasing recycling rate from 70 to 82 percent in 10 years (Government of Korea, 2018) . In particular, the Plan emphasizes the extended producer responsibility (EPR) to achieve more comprehensive resource circulation and aims to establish performance management governance in national, regional, sectoral levels.
Unfortunately, the policy propositions for consumers and households included in the Plan appears quite weak and focuses mainly on suppressing the use of discard after use (DAU) products and increasing the price of standard plastic garbage bags. Nowhere to be found the use of economic incentives for the market to efficiently allocate resources in the chain of production, consumption, recycling, and disposal. Of course, social norms and mandatory recycling laws can be effective in encouraging recycling activities (Ashenmiller, 2010 , Viscusi et al., 2013 . However, economic incentives can have stronger effects as Homonoff (2018) accurately points out.
The results from this paper implies that policies proposed in the FNFPRC might not be effective to achieve the planned goals. The However, it is rather better to support more for household recycling as well as the clean inputs for reprocessing. Furthermore, presumptive taxes on outputs produced either from virgin or reprocessed materials should be charged at the level equal to marginal environmental damages and be used to finance public waste policies. A generalized D-R system can be devised to channel these financial compensation to reach the agents or firms who specializes sorting, separating, and reprocessing. And it could be quite significant income source as
Ashenmiller (2009) points out.
One might question the robustness of the theoretical results derived in this paper in various respects. Ferrara (2003) shows that a combination of presumptive consumption taxes and legal disposal and recycling subsidies is still needed to achieve social optimum even when both the waste stock externality and the households' heterogeneous preferences for garbage pickup frequencies are considered. In addition to a uniform consumption tax and a uniform recycling subsidy, in this case, varying pickup frequencies and differential legal disposal subsidies are also required to achieve social optimum. Considering the 'transaction costs' problem associated with any large-scale recycling programs, Shinkuma (2003) finds that a D-R system is one of the three promising alternative policy schemes. The other two policies include the per-unit charge with an advance disposal fee and a producer take-back requirement system. Similarly, Calcott and Walls (2002) find that the most encouraging policy is a modest disposal fee which is less than the Pigouvian tax combined with a D-R system applied to all products. Therefore, the results in this paper appear to be quite robust with respect to various model specifications and market conditions.
